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In a formal attempt to guarantee public access to government

records, Congress enacted the Administrative Procedure Act of
1946 (APA).I As a result of APA abuses and overall dissatisfaction
1 Ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 238 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. 552 (1986)).
See generally 1 JAMES T. O'REILLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE § 2.02, at 2-2 to 27 (2d ed. 1990). As one commentator observed:
[I]t was not through political maneuvering or compromises that the
need for [the] Act arose. It was a system of secrecy which had, for example, kept secret the memoirs of a Confederate Army general, added a
confidentiality statement at the end of a call-in taped weather forecast,
declined to give security clearance to a textbook of George Washington's intelligence methods and perpetrated a host of other obscure and
absurd witholdings of information from the public.... [W]ithout agency
attitudes as these were, the best legislative work would have been
fruitless.
Id. at 2-6 to 2-7.
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) permitted the suppression of information if it was in the public's interest, the records related solely to internal agency
management and/or for good cause. See5 U.S.C. § 1002 (1964). Specifically, § 1002
provided:
Except to the extent that there is involved (1) any function of the
United States requiring secrecy in the public interest or (2) any matter
relating solely to the internal management of an agency(A) RuLEs.-Every agency shall separately state and currently publish in the Federal Register (1) description of its central and field organization including delegations by the agency of final authority and the
established places at which, and methods whereby, the public may secure information or make submittals or requests; (2) statements of the
general course and method by which its functions are channeled and
determined, including the nature and requirements of all formal or informal procedures available as well as forms and instructions as to the
scope and contents of all papers, reports, or examinations; and (3) substantive rules adopted as authorized by law and statements of general
policy or interpretations formulated and adopted by the agency for the
guidance of the public, but not rules addressed to and served upon
named persons in accordance with law. No person shall in any manner
be required to resort to organization or procedure not so published.
(B) OPINION AND ORDERS.-Every agency shall publish or, in accordance with published rule, make available to public inspection all
final opinions or orders in the adjudication of cases (except those required for good cause to be held confidential and not cited as precedents) and all rules.
(c) PUBLIC REcoRDs.-Save as otherwise required by statute, matters of official record shall in accordance with published rule be made
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with disclosure law,2 however, Congress passed the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA or Act).' From the time of the Act's incepavailable to persons properly and directly concerned except information held confidential for good cause found.
Id.
The goals of the APA included curtailment of the practice where the agency was
sole arbiter of requests for information. HAROLD L. CROSS, THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT To
KNOw: LEGAL ACCESS TO PUBLIC RECORDS AND PROCEEDINGS 224 (1953). It was hoped
that the APA would produce a uniform procedure for such requests, particularly for
the benefit of the bar. Id. The APA further required proof that no other statute
blocked the requested information's release and that the information "properly and
directly concerned" the inquirer. 1 O'REILLY, supra, § 2.02, at 2-3; see also DAVID M.
O'BRIEN, THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT To KNow: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 160 (1981) (citing Congress's enactment of more than 200 statutes relating to
the confidentiality of agency information in the post-World War II era); Walter Gellhorn, The AdministrativeProcedureAct: The Beginnings, 72 VA. L. REv. 219, 219-32 (1986)
(recounting the APA's development from 1933 to its passage in 1946).
2 According to one commentator, the broad terms of the APA empowered agencies with a great deal of discretion which resulted in abuse of their statutory powers.
CROSS, supra note 1, at 228. In a study of federal information law published in 1953,
Cross decried the erosion of the APA goal of governmental openness. Id. at 224-25.
Specifically, Cross criticized Congress's enactment of legislation which, in whole or in
part, exempted certain legislative acts from the APA. Id. at 225 (citations omitted).
The author noted that these exemptions included the Federal Civil Defense Act and
the Defense Production Act of 1950. Id. (citations omitted). Cross also commented
that Congress voided a United States Supreme Court opinion which held that the
Immigration and Naturalization Service was an agency governed by the APA. Id. (citation omitted). Additionally, Cross observed that the judiciary had played a role in
assisting agencies to avoid the APA, citing a Ninth Circuit ruling that the United
States Board of Parole was not subject to the Act. Id. (citation omitted). Lastly, Cross
pointed to another court holding that the APA was inapplicable to the Post Office
Department's administrative hearings adjudicating mail fraud. Id. (citation omitted).
Congressman John Moss of California initiated the campaign to revise disclosure
law. See 1 O'REILLY, supra note 1, § 2.02, at 2-2, 2-4. From 1955 to 1960, Representative Moss, as head of the Government Information Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations, gathered 17 volumes of transcripts and 14
volumes of reports from a total of 173 hearings on agency disclosure practices. Id. at
2-4, 2-5.
3 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1966). FOIA was enacted in 1966 as an amendment to § 3 of
the APA. Kenneth Culp Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHI.
L. REV. 761, 762 (1967). Exemption seven of the 1966 version of FOIA provided:
"(b) This section does not apply to matters that are- . . . (7) investigatory files
compiled for law enforcement purposes except to the extent available by law to a
party other than an agency." 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1966).
FOIA in its present form provides that agencies shall make available to the public: (1) information regarding internal agency organizations, rules, forms, and procedures through publication in the Federal Register; (2) final opinions, orders, policy
statements and interpretations that are not published in the Federal Register and
administrative staff materials; and (3) all records reasonably identified and made in
accordance with published rules. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1974). Section (a) also contains
procedures for setting fees and utilizing the court system to obtain records. Id.
For information on FOIA in its various forms, see generally SENATE COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG., lsr SEss., FREEDOM OF INFORMATION Acr AND AMENDMENTS OF 1974 (Comm. Print 1975) [hereinafter SENATE COMM.] (detailing legislative
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tion, critics charged that FOIA failed to substantially change the
preexisting state of disclosure law.4 Some commentators viewed
history of the 1974 Amendments); Charles P. Bennett, The Freedom of Information Act, Is
it a ClearPublic Records Law?, 34 BROOK. L. REV. 72, 74-81 (1967) (focusing on FOIA
subsection (e)); Senator Orrin G. Hatch, BalancingFreedom ofInformation with Confidentiality for Law Enforcement, 9 J. CoNTEMP. L. 1, 2-7 (1983) (tracing the history of the
debate over the scope of public access to government information); Senator Edward
M. Kennedy, Foreword:Is the Pendulum Swinging Away from Freedom of Information?, 16
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 311, 316 (1981) (defending then-existing FOIA law and opposing substantial change to the law); Patsy T. Mink, The Mink Case: Restoring the Freedom of Information Act, 2 PEPP. L. REv. 8, 8 (1974) (criticizing the Mink case for
undermining the 1966 Act); Ralph Nader, Freedom from Information: The Act and the
Agencies, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 2 (1970) (charging agencies with perversion of
the 1966 Act); Patricia M. Wald, The Freedom of Information Act: A Short Case Study in the
Perils and Paybacks of Legislating Democratic Values, 33 EMORY L.J. 649, 660-61, 683
(1984) (detailing the range of information uncovered by FOIA requests and arguing
that individual freedom would be compromised if FOIA failed); Jennifer A. Clemens,
Comment, Freedom of InformationAct Exemption Seven is Broadened inJohn Doe Agency v.
John Doe Corp., 16 J. CORP. L. 963, 963-79 (1991) (discussing the background of
FOIA as a prelude to case analysis); Glenn Dickinson, Comment, The Supreme Court's
Narrow Reading of the PublicInterest Served by the Freedom of Information Act, 59 U. GIN. L.
REv. 191, 193-98 (1990) (discussing the history and purposes of FOIA);John K. Hoerster, Note, The 1966 Freedom of Information Act - Early JudicialInterpretations,44 WASH.
L. REV. 641, 645 (1969) (charging that early interpretations of the 1966 Act did not
carry out legislative intent);John Moon, Note, The Freedom of Information Act: A Fundamental Contradiction,34 AM. U. L. REv. 1157, 1161, 1164 (1985) (applying fundamental
contradiction theory, that examines the contradictory desire of citizens to be both
informed and protected from information, in order to understand FOIA's function);
Kenneth D. Salomon & Lawrence H. Wechsler, Note, The Freedom of Information Act: A
CriticalReview, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 150, 151 (1969) (noting the failure of the 1966
Act to achieve its goals); Comment, The Freedom of Information Act: Access to Law, 36
FoRDHAM L. REvIEW 765, 765-66 (1968) [hereinafter Access) (analyzing the 1966 version of FOIA in view of the APA); Note, The Freedom of Information Act: A Seven-Year
Assessment, 74 COL. L. REv. 895 (1974) [hereinafter Seven Year Assessment] (examining
comprehensively the impact of FOIA from 1966 to 1974).
The Supreme Court first took the opportunity in EPA v. Mink to contrast the
semantic and substantive differences between the APA and FOIA. EPA v. Mink, 410
U.S. 73, 79-80 (1973). The Court noted that § 3 of the APA was especially problematic because of its vagueness. Id. at 79. The Court criticized the APA's restrictions,
specifically that "'matters of official record'" were available only to those "properly
and directly concerned" with the information. Id. The Court emphasized that the
APA did not provide relief for unfair denial of records. Id. In contrast, the Court
noted that FOIA was "broadly conceived" and stressed that FOIA eliminated the
"properly and directly concerned" requirement. Id. at 79, 80. Instead, the Court
noted that throughout FOIA official information was to be provided "to the public"
and "for public inspection." Id. The Court explained that FOIA's nine exemptions
were exclusive and were there to provide "concrete, workable standards" for determining whether materials should be withheld. Id. Further, the Court explained,
FOIA gave citizens a "speedy remedy" in the district court which had de novo review
power. Id. Moreover, the Court observed, the burden was on the government to
justify non-disclosure. Id. (citation omitted). Failure to comply with the district
court's orders, the Court explicated, would be met with contempt proceedings. Id.
See infra notes 33-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of Mink.
4 See Salomon & Wechsler, supra note 3, at 162-63 (asserting that the Act failed to
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the Act as an important component to a democratic society, despite its prohibitive administrative costs. 5 Others, however, considered openness in government records as a hindrance to the
government's ability to protect the public. 6 Congress provoked
substantially change disclosure law and arguing that the combination of FOIA's
vagueness, the narrow interpretation of the statute contained in an Attorney General
memorandum, a House Committee on Government Operations report, and the federal judiciary's adoption of those interpretations all resulted in the statute's failure);
Hoerster, supra note 3, at 685 (arguing that FOIA left disclosure largely to agency
discretion, as did the APA); Bennett, supra note 3, at 74 (criticizing the Act's revisions
for failing to alleviate the APA's imprecision); Joan M. Katz, The Games Bureaucrats
Play: Hide and Seek Under the Freedom of Information Act, 48 TEX. L. REv. 1261, 1261-62
(1970) (proffering the view that FOIA did not meet its advocates' expectations due to
agencies' manipulation of the ambiguous exemptions).
Ralph Nader claimed that the Act's exemptions provided loopholes by allowing
agencies a great amount of discretion which fostered abuse. Nader, supra note 3, at 4.
The author explained that even in the absence of agency discretion, various tactics
were employed to prevent the release of information. Id. at 5-13. Specific examples
of abuse cited by Nader included the disappearance of materials on pesticides from
the Department of Agriculture's library and the National Highway Safety and Transportation Board's outright denial of knowledge of a report, which had been privately
released to General Motors and concerned possible carbon monoxide leakage in
General Motors cars. Id. at 10-11.
Another commentator noted that the same provisions and legislative history of
the Act were used to support both broad and narrow interpretations. See Moon, supra
note 3, at 1185. The author suggested that the malleability of the statute's terms
allowed agencies to manipulate the interpretation of the Act's provisions. Id. According to the author, this analysis showed that the Act produced holdings tending to
mirror the subjective views of advocates and the judiciary and therefore failed to adequately balance societal interests. Id. See generally Davis, supra note 3, at 761 (criticizing FOIA's unclear language and poor drafting).
5 Wald, supranote 3, at 650. Judge Wald, United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, noted that since the Act's inception, conflicting estimates placed government costs on information request processing at anywhere from
$47 to $250 million annually. Id. at 660. The author put that figure into perspective,
however, by comparing it to the government's annual expenditure of nearly $100
million on military bands. Id. at 665 (citation omitted). Additionally, the author argued that the government's interests in secrecy and the general need for government
accountability were protected under FOIA. Id. at 664; see also Moon, supra note 3, at
1159 (explaining that FOIA balanced society's incongruous desire for self-sufficiency
against its desire for community). But see infra notes 10 & 54 (detailing the Reagan
administration's 1986 amendment of the Act that made FOIA even more restrictive).
6 See Benjamin S. DuVal, Jr., The Occasions of Secrecy, 47 U. Prrr. L. REv. 579, 583
(1986). The acquisition of knowledge, the author explained, is "sometimes a bad
thing." Id. Benjamin DuVal, Project Director, American Bar Foundation, further articulated, for example, that disclosure of foreign policy information should be foreclosed where its release could potentially harm military plans and political
negotiation. Id. at 668. Concerned about domestic issues, the author claimed that
the risk that undercover agents' and informants' identities would be revealed could
subject them to harm and neutralize their effectiveness. Id. at 669. The author posited that some of the functions served by secrecy are: protecting international relations, preserving privacy, and fostering beneficial social conduct. Id. at 669-70. But see
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further debate with its 1974 amendments to the Act,7 which included the confidentiality provisions of Exemption 7D.8 Exemption 7D allowed information contained in an investigatory record
obtained from confidential sources for law enforcement purposes
to be withheld if it would disclose the source's identity. 9 After
many years of controversy over the scope of Exemption 7D, FOIA
was again amended in 1986 to make the provision more
restrictive.10
Kennedy, supranote 3, at 314 (asserting that since FOIA's inception, the disclosure of
an informant's identity had not resulted in a single incidence of harm).
7 See Larry P. Ellsworth, Amended Exemption 7 of the Freedom of Information Act, 25
AM. U. L. REV. 37, 39 (1975) (concluding that Congress, in passing the amendments,
balanced the benefits of broader disclosure against the added burden to agencies);
Ralph Nader, New Opportunitiesfor Open Government: The 1974 Amendments to the Freedom
of Information Act and the FederalAdvisory Committee Act, 25 AM. U. L. REv. 1, 1 (1975)
(asserting that the amendments represented an attempt to prevent administrative
agency circumvention of the regulatory process); Seven Year Assessment, supranote 3, at
943-48 (analyzing case law in an attempt to reconcile the ambiguity of subsection
(b) (7) in both its original and amended form). But see Davis, supra note 3, at 764,
766, 811 (advocating extensive use of executive privilege to avoid the Act, supporting
a judicial balancing of interests test, and proposing amendments to FOIA). For the
text of FOIA's 1974 Amendments, see infra note 44.
8 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(7)(D) (1974).
9 Id. Congress, according to one commentator, intended the exemption to cover
both criminal and civil law enforcement. 2 'RILLY, supra note 1, at § 17.02 (citation
omitted). Further, Exemption 7D precluded the Act's application to criminal investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes in order to exclude confidential information provided by a confidential source. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b) (7) (D) (1974);
cf. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b) (7) (1966) (omitting specific exemption of confidential sources
in the 1966 statute). See generally Note, FOIA Exemption 7 and Broader Disclosure of Unlawful FBI Investigations, 65 MINN. L. REv. 1139, 1156-62, 1165 (1981) (analyzing how
courts have applied Exemption 7 to unlawful FBI investigations relating to domestic
intelligence and proposing that the FBI be required to demonstrate a nexus between
each document withheld and a lawful investigatory purpose).
10 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(7)(D) (1986); see Hatch, supra note 3, at 17 (proposing that
modifications to the 1974 Act counteract confidential sources' purported fears that
their identities would be revealed and the dilemma of law enforcement in remedying
that concern); Kennedy, supra note 3, at 314 (discussing Congress's deliberations regarding the 1974 Act, which could potentially restrict the statute).
Congress subsequently amended FOIA's Exemption 7 in 1974 and 1986. See 5
U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) explanatory notes (1974); 5 U.S.C. § 552 historical and statutory
notes (Supp. 1986). The 1986 Amendments to § (b) (7) provided in pertinent part:
(7) records or
(b) This section does not apply to matters that are -...
information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the
extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement
proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an
impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute
an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be
expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source, including a
State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution
which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of
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Recently, in United States Department ofJustice v. Landano," the
United States Supreme Court articulated that agencies were not
entitled to a presumption of confidentiality in Exemption 7D
claims, and that an individualized approach was the appropriate
method to adjudicate most of these claims.' 2 The Court decided
that an approach examining, among other things, the type of
crime and the source's link to the crime, would allow a court
enough facts1 3 to justify the government's inference of
confidentiality.

VincentJames Landano was tried and convicted of felony murder for the 1976 shooting death of Newark police officer John
Snow."4 As part of his appeal,15 Landano submitted a FOJA disclosure request 16 with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) dea record or information compiled by criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation or by an agency conducting
a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would
disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if
such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of
the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or
physical safety of any individual.
Id.
11 113 S. Ct. 2014 (1993).
12 Id. at 2023.
13 Id.
14 Landano v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 751 F. Supp. 502, 504 (D.N.J. 1990),
affd in part and rev'd in part, 956 F.2d 422, 423 (3d Cir. 1992), vacated, 113 S. Ct. 2014,
2024 (1993). On August 13, 1976, Officer Snow was shot by one of two gunmen
during a robbery of the Hi-Way Check Cashing Service in Kearny, New Jersey. Id. A
grand jury indicted Vincent Landano along with Victor Forni, whose file Landano
later requested from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and two other men.
Id. On May 17, 1977, Landano was found guilty of felony murder and other crimes
committed in connection with the robbery. Id.
15 In an effort to overturn his conviction, Landano filed an application for federal
habeas corpus relief. Landano v. Rafferty, 670 F. Supp. 570 (D.N.J. 1987), rev'd, 897
F.2d 661 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 811 (1990).
In the years following his conviction, Landano accused the Hudson County Prosecutor of wrongfully concealing exculpatory evidence that was essential to his defense. Id. at 575. Landano based his claim on the 1982 recantation testimony of a key
government witness, Raymond Portas. Id. at 576. Portas claimed that despite his failure to initially identify Landano, the Hudson County Prosecutor's Office influenced
Portas to identify him in a photographic lineup eight months later and just ten days
prior to trial. Id. at 576-77. Recently, the NewJersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, reversed Landano's conviction on the grounds of prosecutorial misconduct and
remanded for a new trial. Richard Pliskin, State's Options Narrow After Landano Remand, 136 N.J. L.J. 861, 861 (Feb. 28, 1994).
16 Landano also filed a motion for a new trial based on the Brady v. Maryland
prohibition against a prosecutor's withholding of exculpatory evidence (Brady claim)
concerning the nondisclosure of information surrounding Portas's failure to identify
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manding release of all files relating to the murder.17 The FBI
released only a substantially redacted portion of the requested
file. 8
In response to the paucity of information provided, Landano
brought suit in the Federal District Court of New Jersey to enjoin
the FBI from withholding the files.' 9 Addressing the government's
Exemption 7D claim, the district court permitted the FBI to withhold information leading to the identification of confidential
sources or undercover agents. 20

The court noted that it would

Landano. Landano, 670 F. Supp. at 576-77 (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963)).
In Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court ruled that, regardless of the prosecution's motives, suppression of exculpatory evidence requested by a criminal defendant violated his due process rights. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. In Brady, the defendant and
a companion had been convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. Id.
at 84. Before the trial, Brady requested all statements made by his co-defendant. Id.
At trial, Brady alleged that his companion committed the actual murder. Id. Brady
did not receive his co-defendant's statement, which validated his story, until after the
affirmation of his conviction. Id. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that suppression of a requested statement favorable to the accused violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment where the evidence was "material" to conviction or sentencing. Id. at 86, 87. See generally Nicholas A. Lambros, Note, Conviction
and Imprisonment Despite Nondisclosure of Evidence Favorable to the Accused by the Prosecution: Standardof MaterialityReconsidered, 19 NEw ENG. J. ON CraM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT
103 (1993) (analyzing the Brady doctrine and current standards on nondisclosure
affecting a defendant's conviction).
17 Landano, 751 F. Supp. at 504. On September 30, 1988, Landano requested all
FBI information related to the murder of Police Officer John Snow (Snow request)
from the FBI Field Office in Newark, New Jersey. Id. On January 10, 1989, Landano
also requested the FBI file on co-defendant Victor Forni. Id. Forni initially contested
Landano's request for his file, but later authorized release of the file prior to the
circuit court's final decision. Id. Therefore, the district court solely ruled on the
Snow request. Id.
18 Id. On May 8, 1990, 19 months after Landano's initial request, the FBI responded by releasing 324 redacted pages from a 726-page file. Id. Of the pages given,
the names of sources and a significant number of passages were deleted. Id. The FBI
defended its denial of the information by claiming Exemption 7D. Id. at 505. The
Department of Justice also raised exemptions contained in § 552 (b)(2), (b)(6), and
(b) (7)(C). Id.
19 Id. at 504. Judge Sarokin, ruling on Landano's motion for summary judgment,
noted that courts were required to examine FOIA claims de novo. Id. at 505 (citing 5
U.S.C. § 552 (a) (4) (B)). The government, the judge stated, had the burden of proving that the withheld information belonged within a statutory exemption. Id. The
judge further explained that courts had to adhere to the strong statutory presumption
in favor of disclosure. Id. (citation omitted).
20 Id. at 508. Throughout its decision, the district court relied upon a recent
Supreme Court ruling that discussed an Exemption 7C claim. Id. at 505-08 (citing
United States Dep't of'Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S.
749 (1989)). See supra note 3 for the text of Exemption 7C. Applying the Reporters
Committee approach of balancing the public's interest in the requested information
against the individual's privacy interest ("categorical balancing"), the district court
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grant an exemption of nondisclosure to all other information only
21
after making a case-specific evaluation.
allowed the government to withhold information should there be a realistic risk that
an FBI informant or undercover agent's identity would be revealed. Landano, 751 F.
Supp. at 508 (citation omitted). For any other information, the court required the
FBI to provide reasons for nondisclosure on a case-by-case basis. Id. In a later opinion, the court clarified its position by stating that the government's proposal of extending Re-porters Committee to exempt all informers who supply the FBI with
information went against the grain of FOIA's purpose. Landano v. Dep't of Justice,
758 F. Supp. 1021, 1025 (D.N.J. 1991) (emphasis added).
In Reporters Committee, a CBS news correspondent and the Reporters Committee
for Freedom of the Press sought Charles Medico's "rap sheet," an FBI compilation of
his criminal record, on the grounds that the sheet contained public knowledge. Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. at 751, 757 (citation omitted). The Supreme Court reasoned that the language and legislative history of Exemption 7C evidenced a broader
standard for evaluating invasion of privacy claims than did other provisions in the Act.
Id. at 756 & n.9 (citations omitted). The Court opined that Exemption 7C required a
balancing of the public's interest in obtaining the information against the individual's
privacy interest in maintaining rap sheet confidentiality. Id. at 762.
The Court began its analysis by finding that the common law meaning of privacy
supported an individual's right to control information regarding himself. Id. at 763.
Addressing FOIA, the Court observed that the Act's terms protected private citizens
from the disclosure of personal information held by the government. Id. at 765-66 &
n.18 (citation omitted). Lastly, the Court explained that Congress's policy to protect
computerized personal information, as demonstrated in the Privacy Act, was relevant
to the Court's evaluation of the privacy interest contained in rap sheets. Id. at 766
(citations omitted). Even though the events contained in a rap sheet were not considered private, the Court held that the privacy interest in a rap sheet itself was substantial. Id. at 770-71 (citation omitted).
The Supreme Court recognized the need for "categorical decisions" when information could appropriately be classified in a particular way, rendering individual review unnecessary. Id. at 776. Stating that a strong privacy interest in rap sheet
information was always present, the Court held that rap sheets could be categorically
withheld from the public. Id. at 780. Such bright-line rules, the Court explained,
would prevent ad hoc decisionmaking. Id. But see Dickinson, supra note 3, at 208-09
(claiming that the Supreme Court's decision in Reporters Committee was not strongly
supported by judicial precedent and served to camouflage the Court's narrowing of
the personal privacy inquiry). See also Sean E. Andrussier, The Freedom of Information
Act in 1990: More Freedom for the Government; Less Information for the Public, 1991 DuKE
L.J. 753, 755 (advancing that lower courts have broadly interpreted Reporters Committee
to other exemptions despite opposing legislative history requiring narrow interpretation of FOIA exemptions).
21 Landano, 751 F. Supp. at 508. Due to the government's failure to show specific
reasons for nondisclosure, the court ordered that information not related to informants or undercover agents be released to Landano. Id. Additionally, the court rejected the need for an in camera investigation, authorized by § 552 (a) (4) (B), by
reasoning that the drawbacks of in camera review outweighed its usefulness. Id. at
508-09. A detailed description of the disputed documents (Vaughn index), the court
held, could sufficiently enable the courts to decide these matters. Id. at 509.For a discussion of the Vaughn index, see Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C.
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974). In Vaughn, Robert G. Vaughn, a law
professor, sought disclosure of evaluations of federal personnel management and
other reports for use in his research on the Civil Service Commission. Id. at 821-22.
The Bureau of Personnel Management refused to tender the reports, thus necessitat-
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit af-

firmed the lower court's analysis of the Exemption 7D claim.2 2 Relying on the exemption's legislative history, the circuit court
explained that confidentiality could be reasonably inferred even if

it was not expressly articulated.23 The court emphasized that the
exemption's purpose was not to protect the source's identity, but

to ensure the ability of law enforcement agencies to procure infor-

mation from private sources. 24 The court interpreted the statute to

ing Vaughn's FOIA action. Id. at 822-23. The Civil Service Commission responded to
the action by filing affidavits which concluded that the documents were not covered
by FOIA. Id. at 823. The lower court accepted the government's affidavit and
granted the motion for summaryjudgment. Id. The court explained that procedures
exisiting at the time violated Congress's intent to place the burden of'justification for
nondisclosure on the agency. Id. at 825. Under these procedures, the court explained, the government only had to state that the information fell under an exemption without giving the requester any information to contest the government's
characterization. Id. at 825-26. The court asserted that this would encourage agencies to claim the broadest exemptions and even prodded agencies to let the decision
fall on the judiciary. Id. at 826. Therefore, the court required government agencies
to produce an index stating with particularity what sensitive information is contained
within a file and the relevant FOIA exemptions that apply (a Vaughn index). Id. at
826-27. The court expressed the hope that its decision would effect a change in
agency disclosure practices so that agencies would voluntarily create procedures to
more easily distinguish between disclosable and nondisclosable information. Id. at
828; see Recent Case, 87 HARv. L. REv. 854, 858 (1974) (asserting that the Vaughn
index procedure could leave the requester with only enough information to formulate arguments too general to be of assistance to the court, thus leaving the court with
the responsibility of determining exemption claims) (citation omitted)).
22 Landano v. United States Dep't of Justice, 956 F.2d 422, 436 (3rd Cir. 1992),
vacated, 113 S. Ct. 2014, 2024 (1993).
23 Id. at 433 (citation omitted). The court explained that the 1986 Amendments
exempted information that "could reasonably be expected to disclose" the confidential source. Id. (emphasis added). The court acknowledged that Congress had
changed the wording of the statute from records that "would disclose" a confidential
source's identity. Id. (emphasis added). The court posited that this semantic difference lessened the agency's burden in claiming Exemption 7D. Id.
Analyzing the Amendments' legislative history, the court observed that the Conference Committee specifically chose the term "confidential source" rather than the
term "informer." Id. The 1986 Amendments, the court additionally noted, failed to
define "confidential source" with any more clarity than the 1974 Amendments. Id.
The court emphasized, however, that Congress gave no indication that every person
interviewed in the course of a criminal investigation be considered a confidential
source. Id. The court explained that the term was meant to clarify that confidential
sources included not only undercover agents and paid informants, but also "citizen
volunteers." Id. (citation omitted). "Citizen volunteers," the court defined, were
those who provided information under an implied or express assurance of confidentiality and were entitled to receive the same protection as paid informers. Id.
24 Id. at 431. The court emphasized that under Exemption 7D an agency could
withhold not only an informant's identity, but also any information given by that informant. Id. Comparing Exemption 7D to 7C, the court noted that the difference
between the two was that 7D did not require any balancing of interests, whereas 7C
did. Id. Rather, the court enunciated, a finding of confidentiality would foreclose
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require the FBI to establish, with only a "minimum evidentiary
showing," an assurance of confidentiality to the source.2 5 However, the Third Circuit rejected a presumption of confidentiality in
witness statements for every criminal investigation.2 6 Lastly, the
court rebuffed the proposed in camera 27 investigation to establish
a source's confidentiality, because it improperly shifted the government's burden of proof onto the judiciary.2 8
disclosure under 7D despite any strong public policy in favor of its release. Id. Underlying the rule, the court explained, was Exemption 7D's purpose to protect law
enforcement's ability to procure the help of others in obtaining important information. Id.
25 Id. at 433. The issue in this matter, the court posited, was what justified classifying a source as "confidential." Id. The court opined that the government's burden
could be met by showing that there was a "rational inference" that the informant fell
within Congress's "confidential source" definition. Id. The court reasoned that the
government was not afforded a presumption by only having to establish a minimum
evidentiary showing to support its inference of confidentiality. Id. at 433-34. The
court posited that Congress most likely intended an assurance that the agency would
not disclose the source unless such disclosure was determined to be necessary to effectuate the agency's law enforcement objectives. Id. at 434. Reciting Third Circuit precedent from Lame v. United States Department of Justice, the court stated that the
government had to submit a detailed affidavit explaining the circumstances of the
source's assurance of confidentiality. Id. at 434-35 (citing Lame v. United States Dep't
ofJustice (Lame 1), 654 F.2d 917, 923, 928 (3rd Cir. 1981)). Compare Lame 1, 654 F.2d
at 923, 928 (explaining affidavit requirements) with Vaughn, 484 F.2d at 826-27 (explaining index requirements). See supra note 21 (outlining requirement of a Vaughn
index submission to court).
26 Landano, 956 F.2d at 434-35 (citations omitted). Although the court of appeals
acknowledged that many circuits had adopted this presumption, the court found itself
bound by its prior decision in Lame L Id. at 434 (citing Lame 1, 654 F.2d at 929 (citations omitted)). In Lame I, the plaintiff requested forms that related to the FBI's
investigation of two Pennsylvania legislators. Lame I, 654 F.2d at 919. The forms, the
court explained, were employed by the FBI to record statements that could later be
used as testimony. Id. The Lame I court evaluated samples of the disputed forms in
an in camera proceeding and found the government's minimal explanation for the
need for confidentiality inadequate. Id. at 928. The court explained that the government's justifications for exemption from disclosure had to be individually asserted
and accordingly remanded for further proceedings. Id. at 928-29. Contra Conoco Inc.
v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 687 F.2d 724, 730 (3d Cir. 1982) (requiring agencies
only to "identify the document and state that the information was furnished by a
confidential source" without a showing that it agreed to hold the information in confidence); but see Keys v. United States Dep't of Justice, 830 F.2d 337, 345 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (asserting that Conoco "made no suggestion of readiness to accept such an assertion automatically in the face of contrary evidence").
27 In camera is defined as: "In chambers; in private. A judicial proceeding is said
to be heard in camera either when the hearing is had before the judge in his private
chambers or when all spectators are excluded from the courtroom." BLACK'S LAW
DIcnoNARY 760 (6th ed. 1990).
28 Landano,956 F.2d at 436. The court explained, "[w]hile it is clearly appropriate
for an agency to so tender its files [in camera], it cannot through such a tactic require
the court to do its homework for it." Id. The court distinguished this holding from
Lame II, which permitted an in camera inspection, by emphasizing that the govern-
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The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 29 to determine whether the government was entitled to a presumption of
confidentiality"0 for any source providing information to the FBI
relating to a criminal investigation."1 The Court interpreted the
exemption to require individualized review and ruled that a pre3 2
sumption of confidentiality was not appropriate in all cases.
In EPA v. Mink,3 3 the Supreme Court's first significant opinion
on FOIA, the Court severely limited the scope of the Act.34 Congresswoman Patsy Mink, the plaintiff, sought information on underground nuclear testing, 5 which had been withheld by the
Executive Branch for purported national security reasons.3 6 The
Court held that an Executive Order merely designating docu38
ments3 7 as "top secret" justified withholding the information.
ment in that case had submitted an in camera affidavit with sufficient detail to enable
the court to render its decision. Id. (citing Lame v. United States Dep't. of Justice
(Lame I1), 767 F.2d 66 (3d Cir. 1985)).
29 United States Dep't of Justice v. Landano, 113 S. Ct. 51 (1992).
30 The Court opined that the meaning of the term "confidential" was the one employed in everyday usage. United States Dep't of'Justice v. Landano, 113 S. Ct. 2014,
2020 (1993). See infra notes 74-78 (explaining the Landano Court's reasoning concerning the word "confidential").
31 Landano, 113 S. Ct. at 2017.
32 Id. at 2022-24. Although the Court found that it was unreasonable to assume
that all FBI source information was confidential, the Court opined that some generic
circumstances would support such a presumption. Id. at 2023. See infra notes 80-81
(discussing situations where such a presumption might be warranted).
33 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
34 Id. at 81-84.
35 Id. at 75. Congresswoman Patsy Mink began her quest after a newspaper article
appeared reporting that President Nixon had been given conflicting reports on the
potential impact of future nuclear testing. Id. Shortly after the article's publication,
the Congresswoman sent a message to the President requesting immediate release of
the reports. Id. When her request was denied, Congresswoman Mink,joined by many
of her colleagues, brought a FOIA action to obtain the reports. Id. Mink was opposed to testing in the seismically active Aleutian islands off Alaska because she feared
that such testing would cause ecological harm in Hawaii. Mink, supra note 3, at 8-9.
36 Mink, 410 U.S. at 74-75. The government claimed that FOIA Exemptions (b) (1)
and (b) (5) justified the withholding. Id. The Court recited that Exemption (b) (1)
exempted materials "'specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the
interest of the national defense or foreign policy.'" Id. at 74 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552
(b) (1) (1966)). Exemption (b) (5), the Court enunciated, allowed withholding of
"'inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available
by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency.'" Id. (quoting 5
U.S.C. § 552 (b)(5) (1966)).
37 Representative Mink asserted that the Court erred greatly by interchanging
"documents" with the "matters" that the documents contained. See Mink, supra note
3, at 19. The Congresswoman argued that the Act specified that only "matters" could
be exempted from disclosure, not entire documents. Id. The Act, Mink asserted, was
intended to curb the former practice of using Executive Orders to classify entire documents that were only in need of selective redaction. Id. at 74-75; see also Mink, 410
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Against a backdrop of the circuit courts' inconsistent interpretations of Exemption 7,9 the District of Columbia Circuit issued a
series of decisions severely limiting the public's access to information under FOIA. 40 As a result of the negative reception to these
U.S. at 84 (designating matters as "Top Secret" and "Secret"). Further, in FBI v. Abramson,Justice White, writing for the majority, clarified that the statute required agencies to delete confidential information and leave non-confidential information intact
when releasing documents. FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 626 (1982). The statute,
the Justice explained, did not permit agencies to prevent disclosure of an entire file
simply because one portion of it contained confidential material. Id. (citation omitted). See infra notes 47-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Abramson
decision.
38 Mink, 410 U.S. at 84. In reaching its decision, the Court found it untenable that
FOIA would allow a citizen, through judicial review, to challenge the Executive's judgment in document classification. Id. Additionally, the Court held that Exemption 1
did not authorize an in camera review so that the Court could decide whether
passages were "secret" or "nonsecret." Id. The Court clarified that although in camera inspection was permissible in some instances, it was not necessary in every case.
Id. at 93. Thereafter, the Court remanded the case. Id. at 97.
Criticizing the Court's decision, Representative Mink asserted that the APA was
replaced by FOIA because the APA permitted too much executive discretion. Mink,
supra note 3, at 14. The Executive Branch, the Congresswoman feared, could use the
Mink decision to legitimize the reappearance of discretionary Executive Orders permitting document suppression. Id. at 19. In light of the Act's history to curb such
discretion, the author found it difficult to understand the Court's misinterpretation
of the statute, which would effectively result in furthering the Executive Branch's independence in deciding the standards for information release. Id. at 17-18. Representative Mink stated: "It seems to this writer that the majority opinion went to
ridiculous lengths to arrive at some fabricated interpretation of the Act." Id. at 17.
This discretion was so contrary to FOIA's purposes, Mink asserted, that it empowered
the government to designate even the Manhattan telephone book as top secret. Id. at
18. Lastly, Mink asserted that of the branches of government, the Supreme Court
alone had arrived at this "extreme and undemocratic interpretation" of the Act. Id. at
19.
39 Compare Frankel v. SEC, 460 F.2d 813, 817 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889
(1972) (applying the exemption even after termination of enforcement proceedings)
and Evans v. Department of Transportation, 446 F.2d 821, 824 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 918 (1972) (reading exemption broadly to protect source of information that was over a decade old) with Wellford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21, 23, 25 (4th Cir.
1971) (strictly construing the statute so that records of past administrative enforcement actions were not covered by the exemption). See alsoJohn B. Warden, Note, 51
TEX. L. REv. 119, 120 (1973) (asserting that imprecision of the exemption's wording
caused courts to produce differing interpretations).
40 See, e.g., Center for Nat'l Policy Review on Race & Urban Issues v. Weinberger,
502 F.2d 370, 372 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (denying the release of a report on segregation in
northern schools to a civil rights organization, on Exemption 7 grounds); Aspin v.
Department of Defense, 491 F.2d 24, 24-25 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (preventing disclosure,
partially on Exemption 7 grounds, of the army's report on the My Lai massacre to
Representative Les Aspin).
In Didow v. Brinegar, the court presumed that the mere labelling of a file as an
investigatory record was sufficient reason to deny public access to the information.
Didow v. Brinegar, 494 F.2d 1073, 1074 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
974 (1974). The Didow court declared that its role was to refrain from second-guess-
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decisions, 41 congressional disapproval of the 1966 Act's application,4 2 and in light of the Watergate scandal,4 3 Congress passed the
ing Congress's intent to exempt files that were merely labelled as "investigatory." Id.
The court refused to consider the requester's arguments that the government would
not be injured if the documents were released. Id. Therefore, the circuit court held
that because the documents were clearly classified as "investigatory files compiled for
law enforcement purposes," the exemption automatically attached. Id. Despite the
district court's finding that there was no concern of revealing confidential sources or
premature disclosure, the court of appeals held that an automobile manufacturer's
report submitted to the government was exempt. Id. at 1074 & n.2.
In Weisberg v. United States DepartmentofJustice, a journalist, researching the assassination ofJohn F. Kennedy, requested various analyses on metal and bullet fragments.
Weisberg v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 489 F.2d 1195, 1196-97 & nn.1, 3 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (en banc), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974). The journalist asserted that because there was no federal law prohibiting a presidential assassination at the time of
the President's murder, only the State of Texas had jurisdiction over the investigation.
Id. at 1197 (citation omitted). The reporter claimed that because a federal law was
not violated, the FBI materials were not compiled for a law enforcement purpose, and
he was therefore entitled to the materials as a matter of law. Id. at 1197-98. Denying
the journalist's requests, the court held that the combination of the investigatory nature of the documents and their compilation for law enforcement purposes, justified
the affirmation of the district court's order exempting the files from disclosure on
Exemption 7 grounds. Id. at 1197, 1198, 1203 (footnote omitted).
41 Senator Phillip Hart, who viewed the decisions as a "stone wall" preventing public access to information, led the movement in the Senate to amend Exemption 7. 1
O'REILLY, supra note 1, § 3.08 at 3-28 & n.177 (citation omitted). The Senator
charged that the courts allowed the agencies to apply the exemption without justification for nondisclosure. Id.
The Mink decision was also cited in a House Debate as one of the factors in
bringing about the Amendments. SENATE COMM., supra note 3, at 247. In debate,
Representative Erlenborn specifically stated that one purpose of the bill was to override the Mink case, which held that classification of a document by Executive Order
precluded judicial review. Id. Specifically, the Congressman stated that it was the
committee's intention to make "secret" documents subject to in camera inspection
and allow the court to decide the classification's propriety. Id.; see also NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 226 (1978) (acknowledging that Congressional
disagreement with Mink was one of the motivating factors behind the 1974 Amendments); Roshon L. Magnus, Note, JudicialErosion of the Standard of Public Disclosure of
Investigatory Records Under the FOIA After FBI v. Abramson, 26 How. L.J. 1613, 1638
(1983) (discussing the improper judicial contruction of the Act that led to Congress's
enactment of the 1974 Amendments).
42 Among the 1966 Act's "Major Problem Areas" listed during congressional hearings were bureaucratic delays as long as 83 days for agency decisions; excessive
charges for services that effectively denied information to most people; the inconvenience and legal costs borne by the individual requester in invoking the Act's remedy;
political appointees' power to make significant decisions with little input from public
information specialists; the press's inability to utilize the Act due to the excessive time
delays; and top-level administrators' failure to give FOIA requests appropriate attention. SENATE COMM., supra note 3, at 15.
43 The Watergate scandal was mentioned prominently in the Congressional Debates concerning the amendments. SENATE COMM., supra note 3, at 344. Responding
to an FBI memorandum opposing the amendments, Senator Weicker remarked that
his greatest concern regarding Watergate was the lack of accountability and prevalence of abuse of power perpetrated by federal law enforcement and intelligence
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1974 Amendments to the Act. 4 The Amendments specifically provided for protection against the disclosure of a confidential
source's identity and, in the case of a criminal investigation, all of
the source's information.4 5 Despite these assurances, some memagencies. Id. The Senator went on to comment that the faith of the American people
and the agencies themselves would be strengthend by public access to its inner functions. Id. at 344-45. Senator Kennedy stated that he looked upon the Amendments as
part of the nation's movement away from the Watergate era. Id. at 436. Senator Kennedy criticized President Ford for compromising his promise of a more open government because of political pressure. Id. The Senator cited cases that illustrated the
need for the amendments, including the FBI's denial of a Congressman's request for
his own file. Id. at 440. These cases, the Senator posited, demonstrate that "not even
the FBI should be placed beyond the law." Id. Watergate, the Senator urged, taught
the public that "unreviewability and unaccountability in Government agencies breeds
irresponsibility of Government officials." Id. For these reasons, Senator Kennedy
urged adoption of the amendments. Id. at 440-41.
Senator Orrin Hatch observed that the Watergate scandal overshadowed certain
FOIA issues. Hatch, supra note 3, at 8. The author posited that FOIA's costs could
have been avoided if Congress had adequately considered the ramifications of amending the statute. Id. at 9. The Senator considered the "overly optimistic" cost projections of the amendments to be an example of Congress's inattention. Id. at 8.
44 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1974). Section (b)(7) was amended to read:
(b) This section does not apply to matters that are -...
(7) investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the
extent that the production of such records would (A) interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or
an impartial adjudication, (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy, (D) disclose the identity of a confidential source and,
in the case of a record compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting
a lawful national security intelligence investigation, confidential information furnished only by the confidential source, (E) disclose investigative techniques and procedures, or (F) endanger the life or physical
safety of law enforcement personnel.
Id.; see Pollard v. FBI, 705 F.2d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 1983) (interpreting the amendment to exempt information that "would tend" to reveal the source's identity); Ian C.
Crawford, Note, FBI v. Abramson and the FOIA: Exemption Seven Shields PoliticalRecords,
17 SUFFOLK U. L. Rv. 748, 750-54 (1983) (outlining the history of FOIA, focusing on
Exemption 7). See generay 2 O'REILLY, supra note 1, § 17.03 (tracing the evolution of
the Amendments from 1967 to 1974).
Addressing Exemption 7 in his veto message to Congress, President Ford asserted
that some of the Amendments' provisions were problematic. SENATE COMM., supra
note 3, at 398. The President was concerned that some of the Amendments' requirements threatened the confidentiality of FBI documents. Id. The President also expressed concern that the amendments were overly burdensome because law
enforcement agencies lacked the staff and resources to meet the proposed statutory
deadlines. Id. Lastly, President Ford asserted that, in evaluating Exemption 7,judges
should not be required to evaluate whether material should be classified under an
exemption "in sensitive and complex areas where they have no particular expertise."
Id.
45 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(7)(D) (1974). The statute required that the agency's information would result in discovery of the source's identity before information would be
suppressed. Id. President Ford had objected to this language, which forced agencies
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bers of Congress feared that Exemption 7D's language did not provide agencies 46with enough power to protect their sources'
confidentiality.
Addressing this concern, the Supreme Court took the opportunity to interpret the 1974 Amendments in FBI v. Abramson.4 7 In
Abramson, the FBI denied, pursuant to Exemption 7, a journalist's
requests for copies of reports on President Richard Nixon's political opponents. 48 The Court ruled that information originally
compiled for law enforcement purposes did not lose its exemption
to prove that the release of information "would" cause a specified harm as a prerequisite for suppression. SENATE COMM., supra note 3, at 398.
46 2 O'RmILv, supra note 1, § 17.04, at 17-16. According to O'Reilly, the chief
opponent of the Amendments was conservative Republican Senator Roman Hruska.
Id. The Senator feared, O'Reilly explained, that greater access to law enforcement
files would cause a corresponding decrease in the number of cooperating informers.
Id. (citation omitted). O'Reilly posited that most Senators, however, were strongly
influenced by the distrust resulting from Watergate. Id. at 17-16 to 17-17. O'Reilly
concluded by noting that the Senate bill passed 51 to 33, after Senator Hart compromised on the legislative history. Id. at 17-17 (citation omitted).
Miller v. Bell was a leading case in the movement toward finding a promise of
confidentiality implicit in FBI interviews. Miller v. Bell, 661 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1981)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 960 (1982). The plaintiff in Miller was a self-described litigious individual who was on an anti-government crusade. Id. at 628. Miller
requested the FBI's investigation file of a third-party wiretap on his telephone. Id. at
625. The FBI gave Miller 54 pages of the file, after redacting much of it for the
purpose of protecting the confidentiality and privacy of individuals who had been
interviewed in the investigation. Id. In its analysis, the court relied heavily upon the
1974 Amendment's legislative history. Id. at 626-27. The court recited legislative history explaining that the drafters did not intend to greatly burden the agencies by
requiring them to justify nondisclosure. Id. Therefore, the Seventh Circuit found a
promise of confidentiality inherently implicit in every FBI criminal investigatory interview. Id. at 627 (citation omitted); see also Ingle v. United States Dep't. ofJustice, 698
F.2d 259, 269 (6th Cir. 1983) (reciting the Seventh Circuit's ruling that a promise of
confidentiality was inherent in all FBI interviews) (citation omitted).
47 456 U.S. 615 (1982). The Supreme Court encountered difficulty in interpreting
the terms of the 1974 Amendments because of FOIA's failure to define the term "record," and Congress's use of the words "documents," "records," "matters," and "information" interchangeably. Id. at 626.
For more discussion of the Abramson decision, see Crawford, supra note 44, at
757-59 (surveying Abramson); Magnus, supra note 41, at 1638 (criticizing Abramson's
misinterpretation of the amendments) (citation omitted); Michael A. Stroud, Note,
Law Enforcement Exemption May Prevent Disclosure of Records not Compiled for Law Enforcement Purposes, 57 TUL. L. REv. 1564, 1574 (1983) (accusing the Abramson opinion of
bypassing the Amendments' purposes).
48 Abramson, 456 U.S. at 618. In 1976, Howard Abramson filed a FOIA request
seeking specific documents concerning President Nixon's critics. Id. The FBI denied
the request, relying partially on Exemption 7C invasion of privacy grounds. Id. at 61819. Because Abramson believed that the request was rejected for its specific language,
he filed a broader second request. Id. at 619. The FBI denied access, however, due to
Abramson's failure to "reasonably describe the records sought" pursuant to
§ 552(a)(3). Id. (citation omitted).

1994]

NOTE

1625

status when recompiled in a new record for different goals.49
The Court established a threshold two-prong test for judicial
review of Exemption 7 claims. 0 First, the Court mandated that the
information in question had to have been "an investigatory record
compiled for law enforcement purposes."51 If the first prong was
49 Id. at 628, 631-32; see also Doe v. FBI, 936 F.2d 1346, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (contrasting the proper analysis of recompiled records under Abramson to the analysis recommended under the Privacy Act). Compare Abraham, 456 U.S. at 628, 631-32 (ruling
that the information did not lose its Exemption 7 protection when recompiled, even
for political purposes) with Willamette Indus. v. United States, 689 F.2d 865, 868 & n.1
(9th Cir. 1982) (noting that Abramson did not impact on the court's decision to disclose certain tax information that the Internal Revenue Service had initially compiled
for a non-exempt purpose).
In dissent, Justice Blackmun reproached the majority for substituting the word
"information" for "record" against Congress's true intent. Id. at 632-33 (Blackmun,J.,
dissenting). Justice Blackmun further asserted that the Court's refusal to adhere to
the statute's plain meaning required judges to independently determine whether the
information contained in the agency records warranted Exemption 7 status. Id. at
633 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Separately dissenting, Justice O'Connor charged the majority with redrafting the
statute despite its obligation to give deference to Congress's choice of words. Id. at
635 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor explored the judicial maxim that
the court may reject the plain language of a statute to avoid "patently absurd consequences." Id. at 640 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Nonetheless, Justice O'Connor criticized the majority for disregarding the Court's own statutory
construction rules by avoiding the statute's ordinary meaning. Id. at 634 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting). The Justice later stated that no direct legislative history indicated that
the statute was ambiguous. Id. at 639 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor
declared that the distinction between exempt and non-exempt materials was for Congress, and not the Court, to draw. Id. at 640-41 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
50 Abramson, 456 U.S. at 622; see Crawford, supra note 44, at 760 (asserting that the
Court's failure to carefully apply the Act's threshold requirements changed the statutory meaning of Exemption 7).
51 Abramson, 456 U.S. at 622. Circuit courts were divided over the application of
the first prong of the Abramson test. Richard A. Kaba, Note, Threshold Requirements for
the FBI under Exemption 7 of the Freedom of Information Act, 86 MICH. L. REv. 620, 622
(1987). One commentator explained that various decisions have held that Exemption 7 applied to all FBI investigative files, notwithstanding that their compilation may
have been for a purpose not recognized by the exemption. Id. & n. 21 (citing Williams v. FBI, 730 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1984); Kuehnert v. FBI, 620 F.2d 662 (8th Cir.
1980); Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d 468 (1st Cir. 1979)). These courts, the author clarified,
employed a per se rule such that the FBI's mere labeling of its file as "investigative"
justified denial of the information regardless of whether it was compiled for law enforcement purposes. Id. at 622. In contrast, the author pointed to the District of
Columbia Circuit Court which imposed a "threshold rule" whereby the information
had to have actually been compiled for law enforcement purposes. Id. at 622-23 &
n.22 (citing Keys v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 830 F.2d 337, 340 (D.C. Cir. 1987);
Stern v. FBI, 737 F.2d 84 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Pratt v. Webster, 673 F.2d 408 (D.C. Cir.
1982)). The author noted that Congress failed to offer any guidance on the application of the first prong in the 1986 revisions to the exemptions. Id. at 623. As a possible solution, the author proposed adoption of a "modified per se rule," whereby the
court would presume that all FBI records were compiled for law enforcement pur-
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satisfied, the Court instructed that, to fulfill the second prong, law
enforcement agencies had to demonstrate that the disclosure
would result in a harm specified by the statute.5 2
Despite the Abramson ruling, circuit courts continued to differ
on the application of Exemption 7D.5 3 Congress's enactment of
the 1986 amendments did little to promote a uniform standard
poses unless the requester could show a "reasonable likelihood under the circumstances" that the purpose of the investigation was improper. Id. at 624, 639-45.
52 Abramson, 456 U.S. at 622. See supra note 42 (listing the six harms under
§ 552(b)(7) (1974)). The Supreme Court, in NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co.,
made only a small reference, in dicta, that gave any guidance on how to resolve the
second prong of Abramson with regard to Exemption 7D. NLRB v. Robbins Tire &
Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 223 (1978). In Robbins, an employer requested copies of all
potential witness statements gathered by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB
or Board) during an unfair labor practice investigation. Id. at 216. At issue was the
NLRB's denial of the request on Exemption 7A grounds, which allowed suppression
to the extent that disclosure would interfere with law enforcement proceedings. Id.
(citation omitted). The Robbins Court contrasted Exemption 7A's language with Exemptions 7B, 7C, and 7D. Id. at 223-24. The Court noted that the latter exemptions
had particular references to "a person," "an unwarranted invasion," and "a confidential source," thus necessitating a case-by-case showing that these factors were present,
while Exemption 7A allowed for categorical determinations to be made. Id. See generally Ruth D. Raisfeld, Note, NLRB Discovery After Robbins: More Perilfor PrivateLitigants,
47 FoRDHAM L. REVIEW 393 (1978) (analyzing the implications of Robbins for the discovery process). But see United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 779 (1989) (rejecting the Robbins holding that
Exemption 7C compelled an "ad hoc" balancing of a person's privacy interest against
the value to the public of such disclosure).
53 See, e.g., Parton v. United States Dep't of Justice, 727 F.2d 774, 776 (8th Cir.
1984) (holding that production of affidavits justifying inference that assurances of
confidentiality were made as adequate grounds for non-disclosure); New England Apple Council v. Donovan, 725 F.2d 139, 145 (1st Cir. 1984) (invoking the 7D requirement that the government must show only that the informant provided information
under express or implied assurance of confidentiality and that a balancing of the
interests was unnecessary); Keeney v. FBI, 630 F.2d 114, 119-20 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating
that whether an express or implied promise of confidentiality existed was a question
of fact to be determined individually); Nix v. United States, 572 F.2d 998, 1003 (4th
Cir. 1978) (ruling that a demonstration allowing the court to reasonably infer confidentiality was sufficient to justify nondisclosure) (footnote & citation omitted). See
genera//yJudith A. Bigelow, Comment, Meeting the Agency Burden Under the Confidential
Source Exemption to the Freedom of Information Act, 60 WASH. L. REv. 873, 878-82 (1985)
(offering a comprehensive study of the split in the circuit courts of appeals prior to
the 1986 Amendments). But see Keys v. United States Dep't of Justice, 830 F.2d 337,
345 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (asserting that the circuit split was "more apparent than real").
In applying Exemption 7D, various circuits addressed the issue of the source's
assumption of confidentiality. See, e.g.,Johnson v. United States Dep't. ofJustice, 739
F.2d 1514, 1518 (10th Cir. 1984) (upholding a source's assumption of confidentiality
except where unreasonable so as to prevent the problem of deterring sources from
coming forward); Scherer v. Kelley, 584 F.2d 170, 176 (7th Cir. 1978) (stating that an
agency's withholding of records to protect citizens who volunteered information to
law enforcement agencies was proper), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 964 (1979).
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4

5
among the courts.
Soon after the 1986 amendments were passed, the Second Circuit, in Donovan v. FBI,5 espoused a "functional approach" in determining when an implicit promise of confidentiality may be
found under Exemption 7D. 5 6 In Donovan, the plaintiff sought disclosure of documents relating to the murder of American missionaries in El Salvador.17 Concluding that the information's disclosure
would generally hamper the effectiveness of FBI investigations and
harm specific sources, the court denied access to the
54 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (7) (D) (Supp. 1 1986), effective date Oct. 27, 1986; see also
Susan L. Beesley & Theresa A. Newman Glover, Note, Developments Under the Freedom of
Information Act-1 986, 1987 DuKE L.J. 521, 557-64 (discussing the emergence of a split
among courts on the proper interpretation of Exemption 7 under the 1986 Amendments). See supra note 1 for amended text.
Congress expanded Exemption 7D to increase the protection of confidential
sources by including any information given by the source, not just confidential information, and by changing the 1974 statutory language from "investigatory records" to
the broader 1986 language of "records or information compiled for law enforcement
purposes." Compare 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(7) (1974) with 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(7) (1986).
The 1986 Amendments also clarified that both businesses and individuals could be
considered "confidential sources." See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b) (7) (D) (1986); We Should
Keep the FBI Accountable, N.J. L.J., Feb. 22, 1993, at 18 [hereinafter FBI Accountable].
Additionally, Congress revised the Exemption to information that "could reasonably
be expected to disclose" the identity from information that "would disclose" as originally provided for under the 1966 Act. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b) (7) (D) (1974) with
5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(7)(D) (1986).
Prior to the Amendments' passage, some commentators opposed amending Exemption 7. See David L. Sobel, The Freedom of Information Act: A Case Against Amendment, 8J. CONTIMP. L. 47 (1982). David Sobel, Staff Counsel, Campaign for Political
Rights in Washington, argued that the Reagan Administration's efforts to enact
broader provisions for Exemption 7 were unnecessary due to considerable judicial
deference to FBI claims. Id. at 59. Sobel asserted that the proposed Amendments
would return FOIA to its original restrictive APA status. Id. But see Hatch, supra note
3, at 17-34, app. at 39 (advocating amendment, Hatch proposed revising Exemption
7D to prohibit release of information that would "tend to disclose" a source's identity). See generally Eugene Ferguson, Jr., Comment, The Freedom of Information Act: A
Time for Change?, 1983 DET. C.L. REv. 171, 187-89 (chronicling the political debate on
FOIA amendments in response to the Reagan Administration's 1981 proposal to
amend).
55 806 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1986).
56 Id. at 60. The Donovan Court stated: "Under the functional approach, an implicit promise of confidentiality may be found when 'it is apparent that the agency's
investigatory function depends for its existence upon information supplied by individuals who in many cases would suffer severe detriment if their identities were known.'"
Id. at 61 (citing Diamond v. FBI, 707 F.2d 75, 78 (2d Cir. 1983), cert denied, 465 U.S.
1004 (1984) (quotation omitted)).
57 Id. at 57. The families of four churchwomen murdered in El Salvador brought
suit in 1982 to compel disclosure of all FBI documents relating to the investigation.
Id. The central issue was the propriety of the court's in camera review of the documents and its subsequent order to release the documents. Id. at 56. The FBI claimed
various exemptions under § 552(b). Id. at 59-60.
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information.5 8
The District of Columbia Circuit adopted a different approach
to Exemption 7D, favoring the protection of law enforcement interests by establishing a presumption of confidentiality in Schmerler
v. FBI.5 9 In Schmerler, the plaintiff brought a FOIA action seeking
disclosure of the FBI's fifty-five-year-old investigation into the murder of his aunt.6" Rejecting the district court's analysis that allowed
the release of the requested information,6 1 the circuit court
awarded agencies a virtually irrebuttable presumption of confidentiality.6 2 Finding the plaintiff's claim insufficient to rebut the pre58 Id. at 61 (citing Diamond, 707 F.2d at 78). In addition to Diamond, the court also
cited as support Williams v. FBI. Id. (citing Williams v. FBI, 730 F.2d 882 (2d Cir.
1984)). But see Williams, 730 F.2d at 885 (failing to articulate the functional approach
in its analysis). Thereafter, the Donovan court found the district court's order in favor
of disclosure in error and reversed. Id.
59 900 F.2d 333, 337 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see FBI Allowed To Protect Sources Indefinitely,
Court Rules, REuTERS, Apr. 6, 1990, available in LEXIS/Nexis Library (recounting
struggle of Schmerler plaintiff); Harry Hammitt, FOIA Sufferingfrom Restrictive New Court
Rulings; Freedom of Information Act Special Report, THE QUILL, Oct. 1991, at 29, available
in LEXIS/Nexis Library (asserting that Schmerler was one of the D.C. Circuit's decisions which made success for FOIA plaintiffs "practically impossible").
60 Schmerler,900 F.2d at 334. The FBI acceded to Schmerler's request for his aunt's
file, but deleted the names of certain sources. Id. at 335. After reviewing the file,
Schmerler deduced who the missing sources were and brought suit to confirm his
hypothesis. Id.
61 The court dismissed the district court's justifications for its order to release the
names, among which were the long time lapse between the request for the documents
and the incident itself and the lack of danger to the FBI sources. Id. at 336. Rejecting
this reasoning, the court of appeals held that the Act did not permit a balancing of
interests. Id. Moreover, the court pronounced that the statute did not contain a "sunset" provision for agency promises of confidentiality. Id. A "sunset law" is defined as:
A statute or provision in a law that requires periodic review of the rationale for the continued existence of the particular law or the specific
administrative agency or other governmental function. The legislature
must take positive steps to allow the law, agency, or functions to continue in existence by a certain date or such will cease to exist.
BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1436 (6th ed. 1990). According to the court, once a source's

confidentiality had been determined, the government had no obligation to provide
additional justification for its nondisclosure to parties making claims in the public
interest. Schmerler, 900 F.2d at 336.
62 Id. at 337 (citation omitted). To overcome this presumption, the Schmerler court
required the plaintiff to present evidence that the government had not promised confidentiality to the source at the time the information was gathered. Id.; see also Keys v.
United States Dep't of Justice, 830 F.2d 337, 345 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citations omitted)
(finding an implicit assurance of confidentiality where "its absence would impair the
Bureau's ability to elicit the information").
One judge in the same circuit, in DowJones & Co. v. Department ofJustice, declared
that Schmerlers presumption of confidentiality was incompatible with FOIA's purpose
and structure. Dow Jones & Co. v. Dep't of Justice, 908 F.2d 1006, 1012 (D.C. Cir.
1990) (Edwards, J., concurring). Although Judge Edwards conceded that Schmerler
governed, the judge nonetheless criticized that decision for its "flawed interpretation"
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63
sumption, the court suppressed the documents.
Citing to Schmerler, the District of Columbia Circuit, in Dow
Jones & Co. v. Department of Justice,6 4 formally recognized that its
presumption of confidentiality was practically irrebuttable.6 5 In

of FOIA and questioned its future viability. Id. The judge asserted that Congress's
intention was to burden the agency with sustaining its claim of exemption. Id. Judge
Edwards was concerned, however, that the Schmerlercourt disregarded this directive by
mandating that it was the FOIA plaintiff's responsibility to rebut the government's
presumption. Id. (citation omitted). The government, the concurrence explained,
could easily meet its obligation under Schmerler by filing a Vaughn index without even
including enough information to support an inference of confidentiality or non-confidentiality. Id. Accordingly, the judge concluded that Schmerle's presumption was
irrebuttable. Id.
In a later DowJones decision commenting on Schmerler, the court stated that "but
for the presumption which Schmerler, in truth, strengthened over that employed in
Keys, the case would have come out the other way; the government's actual evidence
of confidentiality was rather thin." Dow Jones & Co., Inc. v. Department of Justice,
917 F.2d 571, 576 n.4 (1990) (citation omitted). For a complete discussion of the
court of appeals' decision in DowJones, see infra notes 65-67.
63 Schmerler, 900 F.2d at 339. The court conceded that the FBI had little evidence
to support its claim that confidentiality was assured and was relying heavily on its
presumption. Id. at 337. Further, the court rejected Schmerler's argument that the
information's favorable content was an indication that no assurances of confidentiality were given. Id. at 337-38. Citing former Judge Scalia, the court emphasized that
Exemption 7D's protection turned on the source's confidentiality rather than on the
file's factual contents. Id. at 338 (quoting Shaw v. FBI, 749 F.2d 58, 61 (D.C. Cir.
1984)).
Rejecting Schmerler's claim that confidentiality was compromised by the case's
publicity, the court reasoned that the publicity had taken place subsequent to FBI
interviews with the sources. Id.
The court next acknowledged other circuits' acceptance of the proposition that
sources who could become trial witnesses were not entitled to a presumption of confidentiality. Id. (citing Van Bourg, Allen, Weinberg & Roger v. NLRB, 751 F.2d 982,
986 (9th Cir. 1985) (ruling that witnesses who submitted affidavits should expect to
have their names released and be called to testify at formal hearing, and not expect
confidentiality); Poss v. NLRB, 565 F.2d 654, 658 (10th Cir. 1977) (holding that
NLRB assurances that the information furnished would remain confidential unless
the sources were called to testify did not amount to a "guarantee of total anonymity")). Nonetheless, the court concluded that Exemption 7D's purpose would be contravened if it were held that a source lost his right to confidentiality when it was
possible that he would testify at trial. Id. at 339 (citation omitted). Accordingly, the
court stated that the plaintiff was incapable of rebutting the presumption that confidentiality was assured. Id.
64 917 F.2d 571 (D.C. Cir. 1990). For criticism of the DowJones decision see, Hammitt, supra note 59, at 29 (reproaching the DowJones decision and positing that the
media should become involved in making changes to FOIA); RichardJ. Tofel, Victims
of the Vault; The Freedom of Information Act is supposed to unlock government secrecy, but it is
most often interpreted to prevent disclosure, THE RECORDER, Jan. 24, 1992, at 8 (criticizing
the length of delay caused by FOIA and positing that the information may become
stale before the action's conclusion).
65 DowJones, 917 F.2d at 577. The court conceded that the Act imposed the burden of proof on agencies. Id. at 576. Nevertheless, the court mandated that confidentiality was inherently implicit in FBI interviews. Id. (citation omitted). The court
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Dow Jones, the plaintiff requested a copy of a Justice Department
report relating to the alleged misconduct of a United States Congressman. 6 6 Explaining that an individualized approach to Exemption 7D claims would result in ad hoc determinations, the court
accepted the agency's presumption of confidentiality and denied
67
relief to the plaintiff.
The Ninth Circuit utilized a more flexible approach in addressing the applicability of Exemption 7D in Wiener v. Department
ofJustice.6 8 In Wiener, a history professor sought the FBI's investigatory records on rock musician John Lennon.6 9 The circuit court
refused to accept the FBI's mere assertion of confidentiality asjustification for its Exemption 7D claim. 70 An agency claim of implied
reiterated that so long as the FBI showed that information was solicited in the course
of a law enforcement investigation, there existed a presumption that assurances were
given. Id. (citation omitted). The court acknowledged that its presumption, as applied in past decisions, was close to irrebutable because it was highly unlikely that a
requester could prove the FBI's failure to consider the need for confidentiality. Id. at
577. Absent "extraordinary circumstances," such as where the source's information
was already public, the court stated, the presumption would govern. Id.
66 Id. at 572. The Department of Justice (Department) had conducted a grand
jury investigation of Representative FernandJ. St. Germain for illegally accepting free
meals and entertainment. Id. Because the Department was unsure about its success at
a possible trial, it decided to release the information to the House Ethics Committee
in a letter summarizing the results of its investigation. Id. The plaintiff sought the
names of the interviewees. Id. at 572-73.
67 Id. at 573. The court reasoned that it was merely following the Supreme Court's
rationale in Reporters Committee that "categorical decisions may be appropriate and individual circumstances disregarded when a case fits into a genus in which the balance
characteristically tips in one direction." Id. (quoting United States Dep't ofJustice v.
Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 776 (1989)). The court
explained that individualized review of claims would be a "terrible burden" upon
courts and would result in "unprincipled" decisions. Id. (citation omitted). For an
extended discussion of Reporters Committee, see supra note 20.
Other circuits adopted the presumption of confidentiality under similar reasoning. See Nadler v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 955 F.2d 1479, 1486 & n.7 (11th Cir.
1992) (analogizing Reporters Committee); cf Providence Journal Co. v. United States
Dep't of the Army, 981 F.2d 552, 564-65 (1st Cir. 1992) (asserting that subsequent
review of confidentiality claims was undesirable due to courts' difficulty in evaluating
these claims).
68 943 F.2d 972 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3013 (1992). For a discussion of Wiener see, Elizabeth A. Vitell, Note, Toeing the Line in the Ninth Circuit: Proper
Agency Justification of FOIA Exemptions Clarified in Wiener v. FBI, 42 DE PAUL L. REv.
795, 830-32 (1992) (asserting that Wiener stood for the revitalization of the courts'
adherence to FOIA and reduction of FOIA litigation).
69 Wiener 943 F.2d at 976-77. Professor Jonathan M. Wiener believed that the
FBI's investigations of Lennon would reveal the Executive Branch's attempt to stifle
political dissidents. Id. at 977. The FBI withheld the requested information and justified its actions by invoking, inter alia, Exemption 7D. Id. at 977 n.2.
70 Id. at 979. The court criticized the FBI for providing a boilerplate explanation
to deal with FOIA requests. Id. at 978-79 (footnote omitted). The court noted that
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confidentiality, the court concluded, required a case-specific,
"highly contextual" inquiry." Finally, the court found the FBI's
use of the Vaughn index7 2 inadequate for its failure to specify its
"law enforcement purpose" and accordingly remanded.7 3
To resolve the split among the circuit courts regarding the appropriate standard for evaluating Exemption 7D claims, the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari in United States Department
of Justice v. Landano.7 1 Justice O'Connor, writing for the unanimous Court, explained the underlying issue of Exemption 7D as
whether there was an understanding that the source's statement to
the agency would remain confidential.75
The Court employed the common usage of the word "confidential" in response to FOIA's failure to define the term.7 6 Examsuch forms had previously been rejected for being manifestly inadequate. Id. at 979
(citing King v. United States Dep't of Justice, 830 F.2d 210, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
The court noted that the approach taken by the FBI failed to give Wiener a realistic
opportunity to argue his case. Id. Further, the court explained, effective advocacy
was impossible because the FBI gave alternative explanations for withholding without
stating a precise reason for non-disclosure. Id. The court declared that the FBI was
affirmatively obligated to disclose as much information as possible under the circumstances. Id. (citation omitted). Failure to do so, the court enunciated, would undermine the adversarial process because the requester, without being advised of the facts
surrounding the claim, would be unable to make an intelligent argument in his favor.
Id. at 986.
71 Id. (citing United Technologies Corp. v. NLRB, 777 F.2d 90, 93-94 & n.4 (2d
Cir. 1985)). The court deemed an express grant of confidentiality to be "virtually
unassailable" and stated that when given, the FBI only had to establish that the informant was told that his name would be kept confidential. Id.
72 The Vaughn index refers to the procedure by which an agency provides a detailed description of contested documents rather than producing the documents
themselves. See supra note 21 (providing a complete explanation of the Vaughn index
and its origin).
73 Wiener, 943 F.2d at 985, 989. The court explained that the FBI's Vaughn index
simply stated that John Lennon was under investigation for civil disobedience and
unlawful rioting. Id. at 985 (citations omitted). Further, the court noted that the FBI
made generalizations in the index that were unhelpful to the court's determination of
whether disclosure was reasonable. Id. at 987. For the text of Exemption 7D, see supra
note 10.
74 113 S. Ct. 51 (1992). For reaction to the Landano decision, see DanielJ. Capra,
Past Recollection Recorded; Informant's Privilege, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 10, 1993, at 3 (discussing
the practical implications of Landano); We Should Keep the FBIAccountable, 133 N.J. L.J.
599 (Feb. 22, 1993) (positing that exempting law enforcement agencies from FOIA
would "threaten the legitimacy of our democratic government").
75 Landano, 113 S. Ct. 2014, 2019-20. The Justice explained that a confidential
source within the meaning of Exemption 7D was one who provided the information
"'under an express assurance of confidentiality or in circumstances from which such
an assurance could be reasonably inferred.'" Id. at 2019 (citation omitted). The
Court further clarified that an Exemption 7D inquiry did not concern the document's
confidentiality. Id.
76 Id. at 2020. The Court elaborated that, "confidentiality is not limited to corn-
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ining the limits of confidentiality, 77 the Court concluded that a
source, who conveyed information intending that it would be published only to the extent necessary for law enforcement purposes,
was confidential.78
Justice O'Connor explained that the central issue was defining
how the government could meet its burden to establish that confidentiality was impliedly assured. 79 Acknowledging that the Court
had supported evidentiary presumptions in the past, 0 the Justice
nevertheless dismissed the government's presumption of confidentiality for all cooperating sources in criminal investigations.8' Jusplete anonymity or secrecy. A statement can be made 'in confidence' even if the
speaker knows the communication will be shared with limited others, as long as the
speaker expects that the information will not be published indiscriminately." Id. (citation omitted).
77 Id. The Court rejected Landano's argument that confidentiality existed only
where the source was promised that the information would not be disclosed to anyone. Id. The Court explained that a policy of complete secrecy would frustrate even
routine intra-agency work, because agents would not be able to share information
with each other. Id. (citing DowJones & Co v. Department ofJustice, 917 F.2d 571,
579 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Silberman,J., concurring)). Such restrictions on disclosure, the
Court posited, would effectively render the information meaningless. Id.
78 Id. Agreeing with the lower court, the Court explained that the word "confidential," as referenced in Exemption 7D, encompassed something "less than total secrecy." Id. The Court further stated that since neither the source nor the FBI knew
whether the information would be disclosed at the time of the interview, an interpretation limiting the exemption only to sources who expected total anonymity would
render the statute completely ineffective. Id. The Court expressly refused to consider
the question of whether an agency waived its Exemption 7D privileges where the witness's testimony was made public through judicial proceedings. Id. (citing Irons v.
FBI, 880 F.2d 1446 (1st Cir. 1989) (en banc)).
79 Id. The Court noted that the agency carried the burden of establishing the
exemption. Id. at 2019. The Court further pointed out that in this case the government did not attempt to demonstrate that the FBI made an explicit assurance of confidentiality. Id. at 2020. The FBI did not often make explicit assurances, the Court
explained, because there was no policy to discuss with sources whether confidentiality
would be maintained. Id.
80 Id. at 2021 (citing Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245 (1988)). The
Supreme Court noted its past willingness to accept presumptions that were supported
by fairness and probability. Id. (quoting Basic, 485 U.S. at 245). Nonetheless, Justice
O'Connor criticized the government's proposed presumption of confidentiality that
would exist in almost all instances. Id. The Court articulated that the government
considered only wiretaps, published news articles, and people who did not realize
they were communicating with an undercover agent, as not presumptively confidential sources. Id. The Court therefore objected to the government's broad exemption
because it did not comport with "common sense and probability." Id. (quotation
omitted).
81 Id. The Court noted the government's contention that the presumption could
be overcome only with the requester's presentation of specific evidence that the disputed source had no interest in confidentiality. Id. Justice O'Connor also rejected
the government's position that the statutory phrase referring to the release of infor-
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83
82
tice O'Connor found the presumption unreasonable, unfair,
and unsupported by legislative history.8 4 The Justice, however,
held that certain narrowly defined situations could give rise to a
presumption of confidentiality.8 5 Excepting specialized circumstances,8 6 the Court required individual evaluation of requests,
which would provide the requester with a viable opportunity to argue against the claimed 7D exemption.8 7 Noting that the court of
appeals had erroneously ruled that it could not infer confidentiality in discrete circumstances, the Court accordingly remanded for
further proceedings.8 8

mation that "could reasonably be expected to" disclose a confidential source, implied
a presumption in every situation. Id. at 2022.
82 Id. at 2021-22. Justice O'Connor criticized the government for its inference that
the source expected confidentiality without anyjustification other than administrative
ease and other conclusory statements. Id. The Justice rejected the government's arguments that it was "convinced" that a "traditional understanding of confidentiality"
motivated sources to give information. Id. Moreover, the Justice refuted the government's assertion that cooperating private institutions would be threatened with legal
action and lost business for their disclosures. Id. at 2022.
83 Id. (citing Basic, 485 U.S. at 245). The Landano Court stated that the government had acknowledged that its position on confidentiality in the Exemption 7D context amounted to an irrebuttable presumption. Id. (citation omitted). Further, the
Court noted that the requester would very rarely be able to present evidence that the
source in question had no confidentiality interest. Id.
84 Id. The Court acknowledged that several Senators had recognized the role of
confidentiality in FBI investigations. Id. (citation omitted) (reciting Senator Strom
Thurmond's statement that the assurance of confidentiality enabled a wide variety of
people to contribute to agency efforts). Nonetheless, the Court emphasized that
none of the changes made in the Amendments expressly adopted the government's
proposed presumption of confidentiality for the FBI. Id. TheJustice posited that, if it
had wanted to do so, Congress would have clearly enunciated that agencies could
meet their burden by merely asserting that the source relayed information to the FBI
during an investigation. Id. at 2022-23 (citation omitted).
85 Id. at 2023. For instance, the Court allowed the inference to be granted after a
limited inquiry into the informant's relationship to the FBI. Id. The Court explained
that such an inference would be justified if an informant had gone to great lengths to
conceal his involvement with the FBI. Id. (citation omitted). The Justice also maintained that paid informers would usually fall within this classification. Id.
86 Id. For example, the Court posited, the government might be able to claim
Exemption 7D, without detailing the surrounding circumstances, when the request
sought information in connection with a gang-related murder investigation. Id. According to the Court, this "more particularized approach" was in accordance with
Congress's goal of enacting "workable rules" for FOIA disclosure. Id. at 2023-24 (citing United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489
U.S. 749, 779 (1989) (quotation omitted); EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973)).
87 Id. The Court noted that the government did not deny that it would normally
be possible to enunciate the factors necessary for the court to find confidentiality. Id.
The Landano Court ruled, however, that when "legitimate interests" were threatened
by the government's affidavit, in camera review would then become viable. Id. at
2024.
88 Id.
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The Landano Court's decision to allow a presumption of confidentiality in some circumstances but not others89 has set the stage
for further circuit court division by inviting the ad hoc reasoning
the Court has rejected in the past.90 Although the situation of the
paid informant may admittedly warrant a general denial of access,
the Court's balancing of various factors9 1 to determine which
sources should be protected will most likely lead to an unacceptable level of judicial activism on the issue.92
Both confidential sources who provide information to the government concerning a credit card fraud ring and sources who furnish information relating to a biker gang murder9 3 should be
entitled to the same degree of confidentiality, if assurances were in
89 Id.; see Manna v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 832 F. Supp. 866 (D.NJ. 1993).

In Manna, the plaintiff, Louis Anthony Manna, filed a complaint against the Department ofJustice and the Drug Enforcement Administration to obtain records concerning or referencing the plaintiff. Id. at 869 (citation omitted). Judge Ackerman,
writing for the court, held that confidentiality could be fairly inferred from the mere
disclosure of data concerning organized crime activity, claiming that the Landano
Court allowed such presumptions "by examining the nature of the crime, or the
source's relation to the crime." Id. at 876-77 (citing Landano, 113 S. Ct. at 2022-23).
90 See, e.g., Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. at 778, 779 (frowning upon ad hoc balancing with regard to Exemption 7C); Dow Jones & Co. v. Department of Justice, 917
F.2d 571, 576 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (disapproving of ad hoc determinations).
91 Landano, 113 S. Ct. at 2022-23 (reciting factors courts should take into consideration when evaluating Exemption 7D claims). Under the test issued by the Landano
Court, the merits of the source's involvement with the FBI would be scrutinized. Id.;
see also Dickinson, supranote 3, at 209-10 (stating that Reporters Committee reintroduced
merit requirements for disclosure).
92 Thus far, recent circuit court opinions on the exemption have consisted of vacating and remanding decisions for reconsideration in light of Landano. See McDonnell v. United States, 4 F.3d 1227, 1260 (3d Cir. 1993); Massey v. FBI, 3 F.3d 620, 623,
625 (2d Cir. 1993); Hale v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 2 F.3d 1055, 1057-58 (10th
Cir. 1993); Oliva v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 996 F.2d 1475, 1477 (2d Cir. 1993).
Potentially, a disparate list of exceptions to Exemption 7D could begin to develop in each circuit. Thus far, under Landano the presumption has been applied to
all of organized crime in NewJersey. Manna, 832 F. Supp. at 876-77. Landano failed
to indicate how courts should rule in cases such as Schmerler where no immediate
threat of bodily harm to the source existed and where many sources had died long
before the case was tried. See Schmerler v. FBI, 900 F.2d 333 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see also
supra notes 59-63 (discussing Schmerler in detail); supra, notes 53-73 (explaining the
circuit court division regarding the proper standard by which Exemption 7D claims
should be decided prior to Landano).
93 Landano, 113 S. Ct. at 2023. Because of fear, the Court proposed, a witness to a
gang murder would probably not cooperate with authorities absent a promise of confidentiality. Id. This proposition is clearly not absolute in light of the fact that the
prosecutor released information regarding individuals who cooperated in the investigation of Landano without any reported harm to those sources. See Brief for the
Respondent at 3, Landano, 113 S. Ct. 2014 (No. 91-2054). In pretrial discovery, the
prosecutor released FBI investigative materials containing all the names and some
addresses of 82 witnesses and law enforcement personnel. Id.
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fact given.94 Although these sources' level of personal risk from
exposure is debatable, both arguably have been instrumental in
solving a crime.
The Landano Court could have taken a more equitablethough more costly-route and safeguarded the interests of both
the requester and the potentially confidential source by requiring
use of Lame's in camera investigation. 95 Congress could resolve
this conflict of interests simply by amending FOIA to require agencies to ask the source whether there was an understanding of confidentiality or whether the source would object to the file's release. 6
The Landano decision, preventing entire categories of citizens
who have been investigated by the FBI from exercising their "right
to know" 7 through a presumption of confidentiality, is not consonant with the Court's considerations of "fairness" and is unsupported by the Act.9" As the Court concedes, there can be no better
safeguard from the shroud of excessive government secrecy than
an informed citizenry; nonetheless, the Landano Court's willingness to utilize presumptions-without narrowly defining the circumstances under which they may be used-exposes its failure to
recognize fully the vitality of this fundamental concept now turned
mere truism.
Tamara M. Burke

94 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b) (7) (D) (1986) (omitting distinctions between classes of confidential sources).
95 See Lame v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 654 F.2d 917, 928 (3d Cir. 1981). For
a discussion of Lame, see supra notes 25-26. But see supra note 28 (stating that use of
the in camera investigation is generally disfavored as a cumbersome litigation tactic).
96 Cf Wald, supra note 3, at 680 (advancing implementation of procedures that
would allow sources to be notified of the imminent disclosure of the information they
provided and would enable them to seek court protection) (citation omitted).
97 Cf id. at 652 (noting that the right to government information is not constitutionally protected).
98 See FBI Accountable, supra note 54, at 18 (asserting that the use of presumptions
to shield information from the public "flies in the face of [FOIA's] plain meaning,
legislative history, and purpose..."). Additionally, the author posited, an informant
who may legitimately fear for his life will request and receive anonymity. Id.

